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"It's Doom Alone That 
Counts'': Can International 
Human Rights Law Be An 
Effective Source of Rights in 
Correctional Conditions 
Litigation? 
Michael L. Perlin, J.D.* and 
Henry A. Dlugacz, J.D, M.S.W. t 
Over the past three decades, the U.S. judiciary has grown 
increasingly less receptive to claims by convicted felons as 
to the conditions of their confinement while in prison. 
Although courts have not articulated a return to the "hands 
off" policy of the 1950s, it is clear that it has become 
significantly more difficult for prisoners to prevail in con-
stitutional correctional litigation. The passage and aggres-
sive implementation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
has been a powerful disincentive to such litigation in many 
areas of prisoners' rights law. From the perspective of the 
prisoner, the legal landscape is more hopeful in matters 
that relate to mental health care and treatment. Here, in 
spite of a general trend toward more stringent applications 
of standards of proof and a reluctance to order sweeping, 
intrusive remedies, some courts have aggressively pro-
tected prisoners' rights to be free from "deliberate indif-
ference" to serious medical needs, and to be free from 
excessive force on the part of prison officials. A mostly 
hidden undercurrent in some prisoners' rights litigation 
has been the effort on the part of some plaintiffs' lawyers to 
look to international human rights doctrines as a potential 
source of rights, an effort that has met with some modest 
success. It receives support by the inclination of other 
courts to turn to international human rights conven-
tions-even in nations where such conventions have not 
been ratified-as a kind of"best practice" in the area. The 
recent publication and subsequent ratification (though not, 
as of yet, by the United States) of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with D~sabilities (CRPD) may add new 
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support to those using international human rights documents 
as a basis for litigating prisoners' rights claims. To the best of 
our knowledge, there has, as of yet, been no scholarly litera-
ture on the question of the implications of the CRPD on the 
state of prisoners' rights law in a U.S. domestic context. In 
this article, we raise this question, and offer some tentative 
conclusions. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Over the past three decades, the U.S. judiciary-especially the Supreme Court-
has grown increasingly less receptive to claims by convicted felons as to the 
conditions of their confinement while in prison. Courts have not articulated a return 
to the "hands off' policy of the 1950s; yet, it is clear that it has become significantly 
more difficult for prisoners to prevail in constitutional correctional litigation. 
Although it did not lead to across-the-board dismissal of all existing consent decrees 
governing prison conditions, nor has it entirely inhibited the initiation of new 
institutional reform litigation, the passage and aggressive implementation of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) has been a powerful disincentive to such 
litigation in many areas of prisoners' rights law .1 
From the perspective of the prisoner, the legal landscape is more hopefUl in 
matters that relate to mental health care and treatment. Here, in spite of a general 
trend toward more stringent applications of standards of proof and a reluctance to 
order sweeping, intrusive remedies, some courts have aggressively protected 
prisoners' rights to be free from "deliberate indifference" to serious medical needs, 2 
and to be free from excessive force on the part of prison officials.3 
A mostly hidden undercurrent in some prisoners' rights litigation has been the 
effort on the part of some plaintiffs' lawyers to look to international human rights 
doctrines as a potential source of rights, an effort that has met with some modest 
success. This effort has also been given some collateral support by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in a trilogy of criminal procedure and criminal law cases4 has, over vigorous and 
passionate dissent,5 endorsed an expansive reading of international law principles in a 
domestic constitutional law context. It receives support also by the inclination of other 
courts to turn to international human rights conventions-even in nations where such 
conventions have not been ratified-as a kind of "best practice" in the area. 6 
1 Compare, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and 
Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2630 (1998) (discussing disincentives to litigation and settlement 
embedded in the PLRA), with Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and 
Prison Court Cases, 81 N.Y.u. L. REV. 550, 626 (2006) ("injunctions [on behalf of plaintiff-prisoners seeking 
institutional reform] remain a vital part of the system by which we govern our correctional administration"). 
2 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Although Gamble dealt with health care issues in general, 
subsequent cases-although not United States Supreme Court cases-focused specifically on questions 
of mental health care. See, e.g., Bowring v. Godwin,· 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977) (discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 45-46); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. 1282 (E.D.Cal. 1995), appeal dismissed, 
101 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 1996) (further proceedings sub. norm. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 
2669551 [9th cir. 2007]). 
3 E.g. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995); for subsequent developments, see 
Coleman, supra. 
4 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (consensual sodomy); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (execution of juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (execution of persons with mental 
retardation). 
5
. See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1931-32 n.1 (2008) (discussing 
dissents). 
6 
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, discussed infra text accompanying nn.114-15. 
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The recent publication and subsequent ratification (though not, as of yet, by the 
United States) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties (CRPD) 7 may add new support to those using international human rights 
documents as a basis for litigating prisoners' rights claims. 
8 
That Convention 
calls for "respect for inherent dignity"9 and "non-discrimination". 
10 
Subsequent 
articles declare "freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment", 11 "freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse", 
12 
a right to 
protection of the "integrity of the person," 13 "equal recognition before the law,"
14 
and, finally, equal "access to justice." 15 
To the best of our knowledge, there has, as of yet, been no scholarly literature on 
the question of the implications of the CRPD on the state of prisoners' rights law in 
a U.S. domestic context. 16 In this article, we raise that question, and offer some 
tentative conclusions. 
First, we shall offer a short history of developments in this area of the law, and 
shall next briefly consider legal developments as they affect the specific issue of the 
provision of mental health services in a correctional context. Next, we shall briefly 
outline some of tHe relevant international human rights law principles as they have 
been applied in this c6ntext, and then discuss the significance of the new Convention. 
After that, we shall consider the impact that the Convention may have on future 
developments in this area of the law, and will offer some modest conclusions. 
The title of this article is taken, in part, from Bob Dylan's brilliant song Shelter 
from the Storm, from the album "Blood on the Tracks" .17 In a full-length book about 
that album, the critics Andy Gill and Kevin Odegard characterize the song as 
depicting a "mythic image of torment." 18 Individuals in correctional institutions 
with mental illnesses are often similarly deeply tormented. We hope that the ideas we 
offer here may, some day, go to alleviate that level of torment. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CORRECTIONAL LAW 
In this section, we shall trace correctional law developments from the "slave of the 
state" status to the "hands off" doctrine to contemporary constitutional law doctrine.
19 
7 See http://un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=259 (CRPD). On July 24, 2009, President Obama signed 
the CRPD, and sent it to the Senate for ratification. 
8 See Astrid .Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, "Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and Forsaked": 
Community Safety, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law As Applied to Prisoners 
and Detainees, 13 LEG. & CRIMlNOL. PSYCHOL. 231 (2008). 
9 CRPD, supra note 7, at Article 3(a). 
10 ld. at Article 3(b). 
11 ld. at Article 15. 
12 Id. at Article 16. 
13 /d. at Article 17. 
14 ld. at Article 12. 
15 /d. at Article 13. 
16 On a related question, see Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Home in the Valley Meets the 
Damp Dirty Prison": A Human Rights Perspective on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Forensic 
Psychologists in Correctional Settings, 14 J. AGGRESSION & VIOL. BEHAV. 256 (2009). 
17 http://www.bobdylan.com/#/songs/shelter-storm (last accessed, March 26, 2009). 
18 ANDY GlLI.. & KEVIN ODEGARD, A SIMPLE TWIST OF FATE: BOB DYlAN AND THE MAKING OF BLOOD ON THE 
TRACKS 163 (2004). 
19 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & !:IENRY A. DLUGACZ, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN JAll.S AND PRISONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 13-19 (2007). 
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 27: 675-694 (2009) DOl: 10.1002/bsl 
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Slave of State 
Early in our history, even basic constitutional protections were not routinely 
available to prisoners. Imprisonment created an almost impermeable barrier through 
which the Bill of Rights could not pass, absent specific legal sanction. Inmates were 
thought to be "slaves of the state." As such, the societal need to inflict punishment 
for transgressions of cultural norms trumped any idea that the violators were due any 
meaningful constitutional protections. The classic formulation of this doctrine can 
be found in Ruffin v Commonwealth:20 
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society of freemen, and 
not of convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men have some rights it is true, such 
as the law in its benignity accords to them, but not the rights of freemen. They are the 
slaves of the State undergoing punishment for heinous crimes committed against 
the laws of the land. While in this state of penal servitude, they must be subject to the 
regulations of the institution of which they are inmates, and the laws of the State to 
whom their service is due in expiation of their crimes. 21 
Hands Off 
Although legal doctrines supporting this laissez-faire approach developed other 
rationales such as separation of powers, federalism, prison security, and the inability 
of courts to comprehend the inner workings of complex institutions, 22 the lack of 
judicial attention to potential constitutional violations within prisons evinced by the 
slave of the state doctrine continued until well into the 1960s. Until that time, the 
prevailing judicial approach to suits involving conditions within correctional 
institutions was the "hand-off doctrine." As its name implies, this doctrine held that 
the inner workings of institutions were too complex and so ill suited to judicial 
intervention as to be beyond the ken of the court. 23 The 1954 case of Banning v. 
Looney was a leading exemplar of this cramped reading of the judicial role in \!OSUring 
(or, in reality, in not ensuring) constitutional protections for all citizens. In response 
to a prisoner's complaint that his constitutional rights were being violated by prison 
officials, the Tenth Circuit, in a per curium opinion, held that 
Courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with 
the ordinary prison rules or regulations. Neither have we power to inquire with 
respect to the prisoner's detention in the Lewisburg Prison. No authorities are 
needed to support those statements. 24 
20 
62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 1871 WL 4928 (1871). 21 
ld., 1871 WL at *4. 22 
See, e.g., Michael Mushlin & Naomi Roslyn Galtz, Getting Real About Race and Prisoner Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 32 (2009). ~: Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (lOth Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). Id. at 771. 
Copyright© 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
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Rejection of Hands-Off Doctrine 
Early Cases 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, a small cadre of pioneering judges removed the self-
imposed blinders of the hands-off doctrine. Willful ignorance was replaced by a 
willingness to hold evidentiary hearings that revealed conditions within jails and 
prisons, which indeed "shocked their conscience." Judge Frank Johnson's findings 
in Newman v Alabama dramatically underscored the issue at hand: 
A quadriplegic, who spent many months in the hospital. .. , suffered from bedsores 
which had developed into open wounds because of lack of care and which eventually 
became infested with maggots. Days would pass without his bandages being changed, 
until the stench pervaded the entire ward. The records show that in the month before his 
death, he was bathed and his dressings were changed only once. Equally neglected was 
another patient ... who could not eat. Although intravenous feeding was ordered, it 
was not administered, and no other form of nourishment was received for the three days 
prior to his death. Another hospital patient, a geriatric who had suffered a stroke and was 
partially incontinent~twas made to sit day after day on a wooden bench beside his bed so 
that the bed would be'kept clean. He frequently fell from the bench, and his legs became 
blue and swollen. OJte leg was later amputated, and he died the following day.25 
Confronted with this type of factual record, judges in these early cases began to 
fashion standards guiding when the traditional presumption of deference to wardens 
and hospital administrators embodied in the hands-off doctrine could be overcome. 
The Supreme Court, in a prison conditions case, finally rejected the "hands-off' 
doctrine in Wolffv. McDonnell/6 holding that "[t]here is no iron curtain between the 
Constitution and the prisons of this country."27 It thus appeared that the Court 
would be, in the future, more responsive to prison conditions cases brought by plaintiffs. 
Historical Factors 
A variety of legal and societal factors worked in mutually reinforcing ways to 
influence the rejection of the hands-off doctrine: 
(1) increased media attention and congressional hearings concerning conditions in 
correctional institutions, likely prompted by well publicized riots in places such 
as Attica and Santa Fe; 
(2) the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movement brought more well-connected, 
middle-class people into contact with our nation's jails and prisons than at any 
time since the Revolutionary War; 
(3) the growth of civil rights law eased the process of holding state and local officials 
accountable for violations of federal law in federal courts. 
(4) governmental funding of legal services organizations as well as fee-shifting 
provisions in civil rights statutes increased the economic viability of prison 
reform litigation; 
25 Newman v Alabama 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 1320,1323 (5th Cir. 
1974); see also, Williams v Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2nd cir. 1974). 
26 418 u.s. 539 (1974). 
27 Id. At 555-56. 
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 27: 675-694 (2009) 
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(5) the general tenor of the times and the civil rights movement in particular 
increased the sense on the part of some inmates that they could effectively and 
properly be agents of social change. 28 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, in Estelle v. Gamble, 29 announced the 
constitutional standard by which to judge the adequacy of correctional health care: 
The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary 
standards of decency as manifested in modem legislation codifying the common- law 
view that "(i)t is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot 
by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself. " 30 
*** 
We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."31 
This test has two primary components, one relatively objective (a serious medical 
need), and the other almost entirely a subjective state of mind (deliberate indifference 
to that need). 32 The meaning of the phrase "deliberate indifference," and the nature of 
the proof required to demonstrate this prong of the test, has taken decades to sorf out. 
It is of particular relevance to this discussion that, in support of the proposition 
that contemporary standards of decency required some minimal standard of care, 
Justice Marshall cited, among other references, international human rights law.33 
LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE PROVISION OF 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES TO PERSONS IN 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Persons in Correctional Institutions with Mental Disabilities: 
Some Statistics 
The statistics are fast becoming a matter of national, bipartisan concern.34 And well 
they should: One out of every 31 adults in the United States is under some type of 
supervision by the criminal justice system, as is 1 in 18 men and 1 in 11 African 
Americans. 35 Department ofJustice statistics indicate that over half of jail and prison 
inmates report having a mental health problem.36 Jeffrey Metzner reports that both 
28 See PERLIN & DLUGACZ, supra note 19, at 15. 29 Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104. 30 
Id. at 103, quoting, in part, Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926). 31 Id. at 104. 32 
See, e.g., FRED COHEN, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED INMATE AND THE LAW, §2.2-2.4 2008. 33 
Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104 n. 8 (citing to The Fourth United Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and 
Treatment of Offenders, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Rules 22-26 (1955)). 34 
See, e.g., the work of the Consensus Project of the Council of State Governments, http://consensu-
sproject.org/, and recent legislation introduced by Senator Jim Webb of Virginia to form a blue ribbon 
commission on corrections reform, discussed at http://webb.senate.gov/email/criminaljusticereform.html. 
For a statistical overview, see Jennifer Boothby, Contemporary United States Corrections, Mental Health, and 
Social Policy, in CORRECTIONS, MENTAL HEALTH, AND SOCIAL POUCY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 41 (Robert 
Ax & Thomas Fagan eds., 2007). 35 
Pew Center on the States, One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections (2009), available at http:// 
~.pewcenteronthestates.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=49398 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ 213600, 
Mental H~<:lth Problems Of Prison And Jail Inmates (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ pdf/mhppJ1.pdf 
Behav. Sci. Law 27: 675-694 (2009) 
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the literature and clinician experience consistently find that 8-19 percent of prison 
inmates have psychiatric disorders that result in significant functional disabilities and 
another 15-20 percent require some psychiatric intervention at some point during 
incarceration. 37 
Millions of people are released each year from our nation's jails and prisons, many 
of whom require linkages to an already inadequate and overtaxed public mental 
health system. Jamie Fellner estimates that more than half of jail and prison inmates 
have mental health problems.38 Gail Wasserman and her colleagues estimate that, 
among incarcerated juveniles, the rate rises to as high as 65%.39 The rate of mental 
illness among prison inmates is three times higher than that of the general 
population.40 We know also that prisoners with mental illness-as a result of their 
mental illness-are statistically more likely to violate certain prison rules, making it 
resultantly more likely that they face segregation and thus exacerbation of their 
mental illness.41 Such prisoners are "considerably" more likely than non-mentally-
ill inmates to be victimized by physical or sexual assault while incarcerated, 42 and 
serve, proportion~~el¥, longer terms of imprisonment.43 In the context of the 
unprecedented incn!ijse in the overall prison population during the past three 
decades, these factors'have combined with the erratic access of persons with mental 
disabilities to adequate screening and treatment during incarceration, and 
inconsistent efforts at promoting successful reentry upon release, to create a major 
challenge on the national scale. 44 
Earlier Legal Developments 
Although the empirical scholarship described above was as of yet undeveloped, the 
compelling need to include mental health care within Gamble's requirement for basic 
health care was quickly clear to early courts interpreting Gamble's scope. The leading 
case was Bowring v. Godwin, 45 finding that psychiatric conditions qualified as a 
serious medical need under Gamble: 
37 Jeffrey L. Metzner, Class Action Litigation in Correctional Psychiatry, 30 JAM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 19 
(2002). 
38 Jamie Fellner, A Conundrum for Correctiom, A Tragedy for Prisoners: Prisom as Facilities for the Mentally Ill, 
22 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 135, 135 (2006); see also William Rich, The Path of Mentally Ill Offenders, 36 
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 89, 9Q-91 (2009) (same). 
39 Larkin McReynolds & Gail Wasserman, Risk for Disciplinary Injractiom Among Incarcerated Male 
Youths: Influence of Psychiatric Disorder, 35 cRIM. JUST. & BEHA v. 117 4, II 75 (2008), citing Gail Wasserman 
et a!., The Voice DISC-IV with Incarcerated Male Youth: Prevalence of Disorder, 41 J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 314 (2002). 
40 Lori Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U.L. 
Rev. 487, 493 (2004). 
41 Eva Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional 
Discourse, 41 u.c. DAVIS L. REV. Ill, 131 (2007); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary 
and "Supermax" Confinement, 49 CRIME & DEUNQ. 124, 142 (2003). 
42 Marschke, supra note 40, at 496. 
43 I d. at 497. 
44 See Rich, supra note 38, at 115 ("Failure to prepare inmates for reentry, and failure to provide 
supervised medication, trained staff and related housing, and social services to paroled inmates almost 
assures repetition of the cycle of crime and punishment"). 
45 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977). 
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 27: 675-694 (2009) 
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In the instant case, petitioner seeks psychological diagnosis and treatment. We see no 
underlying distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its 
psychological or psychiatric counterpan. 
We therefore hold that Bowring (or any other prison inmate) is entitled to psychological 
or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary 
skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable medical cenainty (1) 
that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease 
or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm 
to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial. 46 
With the general applicability of the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment clearly applicable to the mental health care provided to individual 
inmates, federal courts quickly had to grapple with the application of this principle to 
classes of inmates with mental disabilities. One of the early cases that explored the 
basic requirements of a minimally constitutional system was Ruiz v. Estelle. 47 There, 
Judge Justice held that such a system of mental health care had six fundamental 
aspects: 
First, there must be a systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates in order 
to identify those who require mental health treatment [citations omitted]. Second, 'lis 
was underscored in both Newman and Bowring, treatment must entail more than 
segregation and close supervision of the inmate patients. Third, treatment requires the 
participation of trained mental health professionals, who must be employed in sufficient 
numbers to identify and treat in an individualized manner those treatable inmates 
suffering from serious mental disorders [citations omitted]. Founh, accurate, complete, 
and confidential records of the mental health treatment process must be maintained. 
Fifth, prescription and administration of behavior-altering medications in dangerous 
amounts, by dangerous methods, or without appropriate supervision and periodic 
evaluation, is an unacceptable method of treatment. Sixth, a basic program for the 
identification, treatment, and supervision of inmates with suicidal tendencies is a 
necessary component of any mental health treatment program .... 48 
The erosion of the hands-off doctrine was hastened by judicial discovery of 
disturbing and frightening conditions within prisons by those judges willing to hold 
evidentiary hearings When this occurred, the deliberate indifference doctrine was 
aggressively applied and far-ranging remedies to constitutional violations were 
fashioned. From the late 1960s through the 1970s, by way of example, such cases as 
Pugh v. Locke49 ordered sweeping reforms to the violent, unsanitary, and 
unconstitutional conditions uncovered in Alabama's prisons. Pugh is considered 
one of the landmark cases in this era of expanded judicial intervention in prison 
condition litigation, in which relatively loose standards of proof regarding causation and 
remedy had led to long-term oversight of prison condition by multiple federal courts. 50 
While the application in specific litigations and practice within correctional 
systems was more nuanced in the district courts and courts of appeals, the course of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area moved clearly back toward deference to 
46 ld. at 47. 
47 
503 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex 1980) aff'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied,460 U.S. 
1042 (1983). 
48 Id. at 1339. 
49 
406 F.Supp 318, (M.D. Ala., 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977). 50 
See Schlanger, supra note I, at 606 ("A paradigm prison case was the Alabama litigation, Pugh v. Locke. 
Pugh was very typical of the first generation of prison cases in that its substantive scope, its method of 
litigation, and its remedial approach were extremely broad ... ") (citations omitted). 
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those running prisons during the 1980s and into the 1990s.51 In Turnerv. Safiy,52 the 
Supreme Court permitted the limitation of even fundamental rights as long as such 
limitation bore a reasonable relationship to a governmental objective. In Rhodes v 
Chapman,53 the Supreme Court, in a decision reminiscent of the "hands-off'' 
doctrine, emphasized that internal workings of prison security and administration 
were generally to be left to prison administrators.54 
Meanwhile, the interplay between the development of the deliberate indifference 
doctrine in health condition cases and the development of parallel doctrines in other 
correctional constitutional law continued. These two strands came together in 
Wilson v. Seiter, 55 where the Supreme Court applied the deliberate indifference 
standard to Eighth Amendment prison litigation outside of the healthcare arena; in 
doing so, it relied on the logic of Whitley v. Albers, finding that prisoners are only 
protected from excessive force that constitutes the "unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain" by corrections personnel. 56 Finally, in 1994, after it had issued a 
series of opinions moving toward a standard of increased deference to prison 
administrators, the Supreme Court clari~ed the meaning (and subjective nature) of 
that standard. Ironically, this happened in a case that dealt with the constitutional 
right to protection from harm rather than a case concerning medical care. In Farmer 
v. Brennan, 57 the court held 
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an 
inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an 
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from 
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 
must also draw the inference. 58 
Nor may a prison official escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, 
while he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that 
the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who 
eventually committed the assault. The question under the Eighth Amendment is 
whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a ~risoner to a 
sufficiently substantial "risk of serious damage to his future health .... " 5 
In declining to adopt a purely objective standard, the Supreme Court held that the 
requisite state of mind fell somewhere between that of negligence and that of intent 
to harm. 60 Some subsequent lower and intermediate federal cases, however, adopted 
broad interpretations of this standard. The Ninth Circuit, for example, in Gibson v 
51 This move was echoed in other institutional litigations outside of the correctional context. See. e.g., 
~oungbergv. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (articulating "professional judgment standard"). 
482 u.s. 78, 89 (1987). 
53 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
54 See id. at 349 ("But the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons ... , which 
house persons convicred of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considerations 
~roperly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court"). 
5 501 u.s. 294 (1991). 
56 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). 
57 511 u.s. 825 (1994). 
58 Id. at 837 (declining to adopt an objective standard). 
59 Id. at 843, quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). 
60 Id. at 825 ("Deliberate indifference entails something more than negligence, but is satisfied by 
something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that 
harm will result. Thus, it is the equivalent of acting recklessly. However, this does not establish the level of 
culpability deliberate indifference entails, for the term recklessness is not self-defining, and can take 
subjective or objective forms.") 
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County of Washoe, Nevada, 61 held that officials' knowledge concerning the 
prevalence of certain disorders (in this case, manic-depressive disorder) across 
the correctional population could meet Farmer's threshold for "knowledge" of risk. 62 
Madrid v. Gomez
63 
gave additional definition to the post-Farmer deliberate 
indifference standard in the mental health context. The Madrid court applied a 
two-prong test: (I) first, the care must be inadequate as measured by an objective 
standard as demonstrated by a pattern of negligent conduct of systematic 
deficiencies; (2) the plaintiff must prove that the system was aware of the risk to 
health that grew out of this inadequacy and acted with disregard of that risk. 64 
After the PLRA 
By 1995 when the Prison Litigation Reform Act65 (PLRA) was passed-raising 
severe barriers to prison reform litigation at all stages-the Supreme Court had 
already made matters more difficult for plaintiffs' attorneys. There was a widespread 
sense that the era of judicial intervention in prison conditions had effectively ended. 
Indeed, limiting judicial oversight of prisons was a stated goal of the act: q 
The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that 
such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation 
of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive mean necessary to correct the violation of 
the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public 
safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. 66 
The PLRA did significantly reduce the number of cases filed by prisoners. 67 This 
result may also have obtained as a combined effect of the PLRA and increased 
deference to prison administrators. 68 Still the overall effect may not have been quite 
as drastic as had been predicted: 
Lawyers obtained the first federal court orders governing prison and jail conditions in 
the 1960s. This and other types of civil rights injunctive practice flourished in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. But a conventional wisdom has developed that such institutional 
reform litigation peaked long ago and is now moribund. This Article's longitudinal 
61 290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002). 
62 
See Henry Dlugacz & Julie Low, Key Considerations in Liabz1iry Management for the Correctional 
Psychiatrist, in CORRECTIONAL PSYCHIATRY: PRACTICE GUIDEUNES AND STRATEGIES chapter 3-1 to 3-23 (Ole J. Theinhaus & Melissa Piasecki eds., 2007). 63 899 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
64 Id. at 1256. 
65 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 11 U.S.C. ~523; 18 U.S.C. §§3626; 28 U.S.C. §§1346.1915, 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §§1997-1997h.) 6 28 U.S.C. §3626(a) (1) (A) (1997). 67 
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, KEY CRIME & JUSTICE 
FACTS AT A GLANCE: CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjslglance/tables!corr2tab.htm (reporting 1.6 million inmates in American jails and prisons in 1995; by 
2005, that number had increased by 38 percent, to 2.2 million); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 132 (1997) 
(reponing prisoner petitions in table C-2A), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial_business/ 
c2asep97.pdf, cited in Statement of Prof. Margo Schlanger, presented to the Subcommittee On Crime, 
Terrorism, And Homeland Security, Committee On The Judiciary, United States House Of Represen-
tatives ("Review Of The Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Decade Of Reform Or An Increase In Prison 
And Abuses?") (Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearingslpdf/Schlanger0711 08.pdf (last accessed, April 7, 2009). 
68 
See supra text accompanying notes 51-64. 
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account of jail and prison court-order litigation establishes that, to the contrary, 
correctional court-order litigation did not decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Rather, there was essential continuity from the early 1980s until 1996, when enactment 
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) reduced both the stock of old court orders 
and the flow of new court orders. Even today, ten years after passage of the PLRA, the 
civil rights injunction is more alive in the prison and jail setting than the conventional 
wisdom recognizes. 69 
The nature of successful cases has indeed changed. Litigation in the " ... 1980s 
and 1990s ... grew ever more resource-intensive, and addressed increasingly narrow 
topics with more rigorous proof and causation requirements. " 70 One manifestation 
of this in the mental disability context may have been a number of successful 
constitutional litigations challenging the conditions of confinement in SuperMax 
prisons71 and their negative effect on mental health. 72 Vincent Nathan, a vastly 
experienced monitor and special master in correctional litigation, has noted that 
many correctional systems have chosen not to take full advantage of the Supreme 
Court's invitation to reduce services and due process.73 Nathan has argued that 
reform efforts hav~ in.effect changed the landscape so that fewer than expected states 
have taken advanta~~ of Sandin v. Connor's 74 holding that a state imposition of 
disciplinary segregation for a term of less than a year did not require significant due 
process protections.75 Likewise, some but not many prison systems have taken 
advantage of the invitation in Lewis v. Casey76 to eliminate law libraries. Nathan 
suggests that, "In some important ways, the new and more constructive status quo is 
resisting efforts at change, just as did its less laudable predecessor. " 77 
Significantly, some notable cases have resisted the trend away from judicial 
intervention. In California, two senior federal judges have maintained long-standing 
oversight of the entire state correctional system's medical and mental health care.78 
In Plata v. Schwarzenegger, Judge Henderson ordered the appointment of a receiver 
to take over the administration of basic functions of California's correctional health 
care system.79 In Coleman v. Wilson80 Judge Karlton has, through appointment of a 
special master under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, overseen the provision of 
69 Schlanger, note I, at 550. 
70 Id. 
71 While definitions vary, "SuperMax" units are generally high security units or prisons that hold 
prisoners in very restrictive conditions. They generally have certain features in common including 
confinement to cells 22-23 hours per day; very limited contact with other people; limited exercise and 
showers, limited privileges such as telephone, commissary and visiting; little or no access to work, religious 
activities, programming; strict escort polices. See, e.g., William Collins, Supennax Prisons and the 
Constitution: Liability Concerns in the Extended Control Unit. U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Instimte of 
Corrections (2004). Available at www.nicic.org/pubs/2004/019835.pdf 
72 See, e.g., Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir.,2006); Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F.Supp.2d 719, 
(N.D.Ohio, 2002); Jones 'EI v. Berge, 164 F.Supp.2d 1096{W.D.Wis. 2001). 
73 Vincent Nathan, Have the Courz Made a Difference in the Quality of Prison Conditions? What Have We 
Accomplished to Date?, 24 PACE L. REV. 419, 425 (2004). 
74 515, u.s. 472 (1995). 
75 Nathan, supra note 73, at 425 n 19. 
76 518 u.s. 343 (1996). 
77 Nathan, supra note 73, at 425. 
78 Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-01-1351 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005) (findings of fact and conclusions of 
law with regard to appointment of receiver; case involving medical care in California's prison system); 
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (case involving mental health care within 
California's prison system). 
79 Plata, supra. 
8° Coleman, supra. 
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mental health care within that same system. In related proceedings, a three judge 
panel recently issued a tentative order requiring release of prisoners from California's 
prisons, finding a nexus between overcrowding and the state's inability to provide 
constitutionally mandated health and mental health care. 81 During this same era of 
judicial retreat, the Ohio Department of Corrections entered into a consent decree 
that brought significant improvements and considerable new resources to bear to the 
provision of mental health care. 82 
Self-evidently, all of the caselaw developments in this area of jurisprudence are 
intensely dependent on both the quality of counsel and the "politics" of such questions 
as assignment of trial judge, judicial philosophy of the circuit courts of appeals, and 
litigation strategies focusing on either insuring or avoiding the subsequent grant of 
certiorari by the Supreme Court. Other relevant factors (related to, not unimportantly, 
the wider implications of the current economic downturn) include 
(1) the degree to which strapped-for-funds correctional systems make more 
aggressive use of the leeway provided to them by the Supreme Court; 
(2) the extent to which large firms, which have been instrumental in recent 
successful litigations in this area, maintain their commitment to this area during 
times of fiscal constraint; and 
(3) the impact of economic circumstances on the scope of relief granted by trial 
courts. 
In short, there are many factors here beyond judicial philosophies that are likely to 
have a major impact on the denouement of subsequent developments in this area of 
the law. With this in mind, we tum next to the "outside event" question of the 
potential influence of international human rights law on domestic correctional law 
and policies. 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
In General83 
Human rights are necessary for all individuals; human rights violations occur when 
persons are treated as objects or as a means to others' ends. 84 Offenders have 
enforceable human rights. 85 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action86 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights87 recognized that inherent dignity 
and inalienable rights of all individuals are the foundation of freedom, justice, and 
peace. Through global covenants, individual rights regarding offenders are 
81 Plata v. Schwarzenegger, F.3d, 2009 WL 764543 (9th Cir. 2009). The full tentative ruling is available 
at http://clearinghouse.wusd.edu/detail.php?id=589 (last accessed April 9, 2009). As this article went to 
press, the final order was signed. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. cir. S-90-0520 LKK JAM P (Filed 
August 4, 2009). 
82 Dunn v. Voinivich, No. CI-93-0166 (S.D. Ohio Julyl, 1995) (consent decree). 
83 This section is generally adapted from Birgden & Perlin, supra note 16. 84 Tony Ward & Astrid Birgden, Human Rights And Clinical Correctional Practice. 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT 
BEHAV. 628 (2007). 
85 Birden & Perlin, supra note 8; Birgden & Perlin, supra note 16. 
86 http//www. unhchr.ch/huridocdalhuridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/ A. CONF.I57 .23.En 87 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: 
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 27-33 (2006). 
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safeguarded against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, 88 
prisoners should be treated with humanity and dignity, and provided with 
reformation and social rehabilitation, 89 individuals are guaranteed the right to 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 90 individuals are 
guaranteed respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in forensic and 
correctional systems,91 and prisoners should be treated in a humane manner and 
with dignity. 92 
As Applied to Persons with Disabilities93 
Historical Background 
Remarkably, the issue of the human rights of people with disabilities, particularly 
people with mental disabilities,94 had been ignored for decades by the international 
agencies vested with the protection of human rights on a global scale. 95 Early 
developments in gloJ;ral international human rights law following World War H-
and the various fomis of human rights advocacy that emerged in the decades that 
followed-failed to focus on mental disability rights. As Dr. Theresa Degener, a 
noted disability scholar and activist, has observed: 
[D]rafters of the International Bill of Human Rights did not include disabled persons as 
a distinct group vulnerable to human rights violations. None of the equality clauses of 
any of the three instruments of this Bill, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) (hereinafter UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) (hereinafter ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966) (hereinafter ICESCR), mention disability as a protected 
category. 96 
It was not until the United Nations' declaration of 1981 as the International Year of 
Disabled Persons97 that there was significant activity on an international level. The 
United Nations General Assembly subsequently established the World Programme of 
Action Concerning Disabled Persons, 98 and declared 1983 to 1992 to be the Decade of 
Disabled Persons.99 As part of these efforts, the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission appointed two special rapporteurs to investigate and report on the 
88 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 7 (1966). 
89 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 10 (1966). 
90 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12 (1966). 
91 Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice (2001). 
92 United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, 1988. See generally Birgden & Perlin, supra note 16. 
93 This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human 
Rights: Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Dudley ed., 
2009) (in press). 
94 There is no single, universally accepted definition of "mental disabilities." The terminology varies from 
country to country, jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and even document to document. In this chapter, we use 
"mental disabilities" to encompass both psychiatric disorders and intellectual disabilities. 
95 We focus here on this population as the focus of our article is on this population in a correctional law 
context. 
96 Theresa Degener, International Disability Law-A New Legal Subject on the Rise: The Interregional 
Experts' Meeting in Hong Kong, December 13-17, 1999, 18 BERKELEY J. INTL. L. 180, 187 (2000). 
97 G.A. Res. 123, U.N. GAOR, 31st Session (1976). 
98 G.A. Res. 52, U.N. GAOR, 37th Session (1982). 
99 G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 37th Session (1982). 
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human rights of persons with mental disabilities, 100 and in 1991, the General 
Assembly adopted the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for 
the Improvement of Mental Health Care (widely referred to as the "MI Principles"). 101 
The MI Principles established the most comprehensive international human rights 
standards for persons with mental disabilities, and their adoption was a critical global 
step in recognizing mental disability rights issues within the human rights arena. 
Degener's writings reflect the change that has taken place in disability rights 
jurisprudence. In 2000, she stated further that "disability has been reclassified as a 
human rights issue," and that "law reforms in this area are intended to provide equal 
opportunities for disabled people and to combat their segregation, institutionaliza-
tion and exclusion as typical forms of disability-based discrimination." 102 
Yet, historically, mainstream human rights protection systems and advocacy 
organizations had difficulty acknowledging mental disability rights as part of their 
mandates. The human rights issues encountered by persons with mental disabilities 
may have been perceived as too complex or esoteric. This challenge was sometimes 
articulated in rather unfortunate ways, such as "We work in human rights, not 
mental disability rights." 103 While the oblique suggestion that people with mental 
disabilities were not "human" was generally unintended, it may well have reflected 
deep-seated beliefs that they were somehow less human than the broader population 
whose human rights merited unquestioned protection. 104 But while human rights 
are-by definition-universally possessed by all humans, the formal recognition of 
the applicability of these rights in contexts specific to vulnerable populations is 
critical for their enforcement. 
To some extent, this new interest in human rights protections for people with 
disabilities echoes a larger international movement to protect human rights, 105 and 
100 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABiliTY, U.N. Doc. E/ 
CN.4/Sub.2/1991/31 (report by Leandro Despouy), and PRINCIPLES, GUIDEllNES, AND GUARANTEES FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF PERSONS DETAINED ON GROUNDS OF MENTAL ILL-HEALTH OR SUFFERING FROM MENTAL 
DISORDER, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/17 (report by Erica-Irene Daes).It is sobering that these reports 
were, for all practical purposes, the first major governmental documents ever published discussing these 
issues. We believe that sanism-manifested here by a refusal to take seriously the issues that affect persons 
with mental disabilities, especially institutionalized persons-is the root cause of this phenomenon. See 
Perlin & Szeli, supra note 93; Michael L. Perlin, "Through the Wild Cathedral Evening": Barriers, Attitudes, 
Participatory Democracy, Professor Tenbroek, and the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. ON 
C.L. & C.R. 413, 417-18 (2008). 
101 G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49,Annex at 189, U.N. Doc. N46/49 (1991). See 
Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy under the "Principles for the 
Protection of Persons with Mental illness", 16 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY 257 (1993), for a detailed discussion of 
the development of mental disability rights protections within the United Nations human rights system. 
102 Degener, supra note 96, at 181. 
103 Variations on such a statement have been encountered by the authors and their colleagues in 
discussions with human rights organizations across the globe, on practically every continent. 
104 See Michael L. Perlin, "When the Winds of Changes Shift": International Teaching For Social Change, 
or, Why Doing What We Do Keeps Us "Forever Young," (paper presented at Society of American Law 
Teachers conference, University of California Berkeley Law School, March 15, 2008), manuscript at 9: 
When I have shared with others our vision of [doing mental disability law advocacy work and teaching 
on-line mental disability law courses] in sub-Saharan East Africa, those others have often scoffed, 
suggesting that the problems faced in that part of the world are so profound that it is almost frivolous 
to create the programs we are seeking to launch. As you might expect, I disagree, profoundly. 
105 See B.G. Ramcharan, Strategies for the International Protection of Human Rights in the 1990s, 13 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 155 (1991) (Ramcharan is former Deputy UN High Commissioner for Human Rights). 
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appears to more precisely follow track C. Raj Kumar's observation that "the judicial 
protection of human rights and constitutionalization of human rights may be two 
important objectives by which the rule oflaw can be preserved and which may govern 
future human rights work." 106 
More Recent Application of International Human Rights Law Doctrines to 
Persons with Disabilitie/07 
Many obstacles to the enforcement of U.N. human rights conventions have been 
identified in the decades since the entry into force of the ICCPR and the ICES CR. 
These include concerns that (1) there is limited enforcement machinery; (2) the 
existing machinery is understaffed, underfunded, and may not have the authority to 
compel compliance with-or to punish violations of-human rights standards; (3) 
ultimately, human rights enforcement may be viewed as a State function ("the fox 
guarding the henhouse" syndrome); and (4) the general lack of accountability that 
results from some of these issues. 108 
' 1 What has our 'tr1i.}:k record been with regard to such conventions? To be 
charitable, it is a mixed bag. Courts in the U.S. have been inconsistent in their 
enforcement of and adherence to UN Conventions. 109 In Lareau v. Manson, 
110 
a 
federal district court cited to United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners standards in cases involving the "double bunking" of 
inmates, 111 but on the other hand, in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp./ 12 the 
Second Circuit found that the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) did not convey a private right of action to plaintiffs as a matter oflaw. 
In at least one case, however, while noting that the non-ratified convention was not 
binding on U.S. courts, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court "read the entire 
text of the convention ... and conclude[d] that the outcome of the proceedings in this 
case are completely in accord with principles expressed therein." 113 
Most significantly and most recently, in Roper v. Simmons, 114 in the course 
of striking down the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme Court (per 
106 C. Raj Kumar, Moving Beyond Constitutionalization and Judicial Protection of Human Rights-Building 
on the Hong Kong Experience of Civil Society Empowerment, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 281, 282 
(2003). 
107 Much of this section is adapted ftom Michael L. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come": The Implications of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional 
Mental Disability Law, 29 NO. ILL. U.L. REV. 483 (2009). See also generally PERLIN & DLUGACZ, supra note 19, 
at 977-1049. 
108 See, e.g., Enforcing Human Rights: The U.N. Machinery, 30 U.N. CHRON. 93 (Mar. 1993).Also, note that 
even with the general human rights instruments, the lack of universal consensus about the rights to be 
protected creates a considerable sticking point in enforcement. 
109 See generally Alvin Bronstein & Jenni Gainsborough, Using International Human Rights Law and 
Standards/or U.S. Prison Reform, 24 PACE. L. FEY. 811 (2004). 
110 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187-89 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in part &rev'd in part, 651 F. 2d 96 (2d Cir. 
1981). 
111 Compare Bott v. DeLand, 922 P. 2d 732 (Utah 1996), overruled on other grounds in Spackman ex rei. 
Spackman v. Bd. OfEduc., 16 P. 3d 2000 (Utah 2000) (Utah's unnecessary abuse standard based upon 
"internationally accepted standards of humane treatment"). 
112 414 F.3d 233, 257, 259 (2d Cir. 2003). 
113 Adoption of Peggy, 767 NE 2d 29, 38 (Mass 2002). 
114 543 U.S. 551 (2005). See also Statev. Romano, 155 P. 3d 1102, 1114 n. 14 (Hawai'i 2007) (relying, in 
part, on the UN Convention for the Traffic in Person and the Exploitation of Others, in opinion affirming a 
prostitution conviction, and citing approvingly Almeida v. Correa, 465 P. 2d 564, 570-71 (Hawai'i 1970) 
for its citations to a UNESCO document in its resolution of a paternity case). 
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Justice Kennedy) acknowledged that the United States had not ratified the CRC, but 
added 
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion 
against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the 
instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime. 
See Brief for Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici 
Curiae 10-11. The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, 
does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions. 115 
There is some important literature that suggests that, in other nations, in other 
contexts, ratification of a UN Convention has had a salutary impact on domestic law. 
Writing about the ratification in the UK of the CRC, Prof. Adrian James has written: 
[T]here have been significant changes in the environment within which children's issues 
are addressed in both private and public law cases in the family courts; in addition, it is 
also clear that at an organizational level, major strides have been taken in embracing the 
provisions of the [CRC] and in making children's rights, especially those of 
participation, meaningful. 116 
Although this has rarely been the subject of scholarly consideration in this context, 
it appears that these developments, in a way, can be seen as "closing the loop·"; that 
is, a mutually re-enforcing phenomenon of early forays into the tentative acceptance 
of international human rights law principles is seen as reinforcing the norms that 
underlay them, and that acceptance then leads to stronger iterations of these 
principles-in conventions, treaties, etc-that then help entrench the standard -as 
a best practice or eventually as a standard of care-that eventually works its way back 
into domestic constitutional law. 
The Specific Application of International Human Rights Law to 
Correctional Law 
International human rights law and standards specifically address the full range of 
issues that affect prisoners with mental illness. 117 A "white paper" prepared by the 
American Friends Service Committee reveals how documents such as the ICCPR, 
the ICESCR, and the Convention Against Torture all contain significant protections 
to persons in correctional institutions. 118 In this context, recently, Professor Eva Nilsen 
has written persuasively that global human rights standards should be relied on as a 
source of legal protections for persons in correctional settings, 119 arguing that 
115 At 578. Soberingly, a recent survey by Professor Jean Koh Peters found that almost three-quarters of 
children worldwide live in countries where CRC is not observed or where evidence as to observance is 
inconclusive, despite CRC's widespread ratification. Jean Koh Peters, How Chz7dren are Heard in Chz7d 
Protective Proceedings, in the United States and Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations, 
and Areas for Further Study, 6 NEV. L.J. 966, 968-69 (2006). 
116 Adrian James, Children, the UNCRC, and Family Law in England and Wales, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 53, 61 
(2008).1n a recent filing with the U.S. Supreme Court, amicus Disability Rights Legal Center of Los 
Angeles, CA, has relied on a Submission to the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education of the UN 
Human Rights Council in support of its arguments on behalf of number of students with disabilities 
eligible for special education in adult correctional facilities. See Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 
Docket# 08-305 (2009). 
117 Fellner, supra note 38, at 140. 
118 American Friends Service, Correlation of Prisoners' Issues and Conditions to International Covenants and 
Treaties: An AFSC Resource Guide (2003), posted at http://www.massdecarcerate.org/download/C]Issue_ 
treaty_correlation200306.pdf (last accessed, March 26, 2009). 
119 Nilsen, supra note 41. 
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international courts-in their interpretations of such standards-"give a robust 
interpretation to claims of degrading treatment that violates human dignity."
120 
Alvin Bronstein andJenni Gains borough similarly argue that "the U.S. unquestionably has 
a moral responsibility to accept as binding [international] human rights standards."
121 
The question is then posed: what impact does the new CRPD have on these arguments? 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES (CRPD) 122 
Historical Background 
Disability rights as a human rights issue has now taken center stage at the United Nations, 
and the involvement of stakeholders-consumers and users of psychiatric services, some-
times referred to as "survivor groups"123-has been critical in the most significant historical 
development in th~ re~ognition of the human rights of persons with mental disabilities: 
the drafting and adoption of a binding international disability rights convention. 
124 
In late 2001, the'United Nations General Assembly established an ad hoc 
committee "to consider proposals for a comprehensive and integral international 
convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, 
...• " 125 The Ad Hoc Committee drafted a document over the course of five years 
and eight sessions, and the new Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities126 
was adopted in December 2006 and opened for signature in March 2007.
127 
It 
entered into force-thus becoming legally binding on state parties-on May 3, 
2008, 30 days after the 20th ratification. 128 One of the hallmarks of the process that 
led to the publication of the UN Convention was the participation of persons with 
disabilities and the clarion cry "Nothing about us without us."
129 
This has led 
120 Id. at 160, and see id. at 160--61 nn. 246-50 (citing sources). 
121 Bronstein & Gainsborough, supra note 109, at 814 (emphasis added). 
122 This section is adapted from Perlin, supra note 108. 
123 Perlin, supra note 7, at 438. 
124 On the singular role of this Convention, see, e.g., Frederic Megret, The Disabilities Convention: Toward a 
HolisticConceptofrights, available athttp://ssrn.co/abstract=1267726, and Frederic Megret, The Disabilities 
Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights? 30 HUM. RIGHTS 494 (2008); 
Michael Ashley Stein & Janet Lord, Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, and the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. CIV llB. & CJV. RTS. 167 (2008). 
125 G.A. Res. 56/168 (2001). 
126 G.A. Res. A/61/611 (2006). 
127 G.A. Res. A/61/106 (2006). 
128 On the 20th ratification, see http://www. un.org/News/Press/docs/20081hr494l.doc.htm. See generally 
Tara Melish, The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should 
Ratify, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 37, 44 (Winter 2007); Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond 
Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 1203 (2007). 
129 See, e.g., Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 n.15 (2008): 
See, for example, Statement by Hon Ruth Dyson, Minister for Disability Issues, New Zealand 
Mission to the UN, for Formal Ceremony at the Signing of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disability, 30 March 2007: "Just as the Convention itself is the product of a remarkable 
partnership between governments and civil society, effective implementation will require a continu-
ation of that partnership." The negotiating slogan 'Nothing about us without us' was adopted by the 
International Disability Caucus, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/documents/Stat_ 
Conv/nzam.doc [last accessed 13 November 2007]. 
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commentators to conclude that the Convention "is regarded as having finally 
empowered the 'world's largest minority' to claim their rights, and to panicipate in 
international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved 
specific treaty recognition and protection."130 
The Disability Convention funhers the human rights approach to disability and 
recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most every aspect of 
life. 131 As referred to above, it calls for "respect for inherent dignity" 132 and "non-
discrimination."133 Subsequent anicles declare "freedom from torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,"134 "freedom from exploitation, 
violence and abuse,"135 and a right to protection of the "integrity of the person."136 
Impact of CRPD 
A recent proposal seeking to reform correctional law and practices as they affect 
persons with mental disabilities recommends that prisons be required to adopt 
procedures guaranteeing systematic screening for mental illness, and that in cases 
involving allegations of violations of the Eighth Amendment, the current subjective 
standard be replaced with an objective standard. 137 The new UN Convention is 
entirely in accord with these recommendations. 
130 Id., n. 17 (see, e.g., statements made by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, 
and the Permanent Representative of New Zealand and Chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Com-
prehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Ambassador Don Mackay, at a Special Event on the Convention on 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, convened by the UN Human Rights Council, 26 March 2007, 
available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/7444B2E219117CE8-
C12572AA004C570l?OpenDocument [last accessed 13 November 2007)). 
131 See, e.g., for a thoughtful and helpful forerunner article, Aaron Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting 
Through the Lens of Mental Disability: The Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 181 (2005). 
132 CRPD, supra note 7, Article 3(a). 
133 Id., Article 3(b). 
134 !d., Atticle 15. 
135 Id., Article 16. 
136 Id., Article 17. 
137 Marschke, supra note, 40 at 532. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994): 
We reject petitioner's invitation to adopt an objective test for deliberate indifference. We hold instead 
that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate 
humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. This 
approach comports best with the text of the Amendment as our cases have interpreted it. The Eighth 
Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual "conditions"; it outlaws cruel and unusual "punish-
ments." An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might wen be 
something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result society might wen wish to assure 
compensation. The common Jaw reflects such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely 
objective basis. See Prosser and Keeton §§2, 34, pp. 6, 213-214; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U.S.C. §§2671-2680; United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 
(1963). But an official's failure to aneviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, 
while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of 
punishment. 
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Prison inmates were once traditionally deprived of protections afforded to other 
citizens by the Bill of Rights. Later, in spite of the fact that prisoners were no longer 
considered "slaves of the state," judicial deference to the putative expenise of prison 
administrators left no practicable avenue of redress for those seeking relief from 
alleged constitutional violations. Through a confluence oflegal, social, and doctrinal 
developments of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the wall between the Constitution 
and the inner workings of prisons began to crumble in the 1960s and 1970s, leading 
to judicial decisions in which federal judges issued sweeping injunctions that affected 
most aspects of prison life, specifically aspects dealing with physical and mental 
health care. However, although many of the injunctions entered in these cases still 
remained in force, the 1980s and 1990s brought multiple imponant Supreme Coun 
opinions emphasizing a renewed deference to prison administrators. During the 
latter pan of this period, the Supreme Coun clarified the subjective nature of the 
Eighth AmendmenCtdt in prison litigation (the deliberate indifference standard), 
forcing plaintiffs to adduce proof as to the state actor's "state of mind." These 
jurisprudential trends were reinforced by the passage of the PLRA, with its 
exhaustion requirements and significant restrictions on injunctive relief. 
Overall, prisoner suits were reduced and standards of proof of causation became 
more stringent. However, the granting of injunctive relief was not, as many had 
predicted, fully cunailed. 138 This may have been the result of a "lag" in the impact of 
the PLRA (as some large scale and long-standing cases remained vibrant), and may, 
as Nathan has argued, 139 indicate a resistance to change on the part of corrections 
systems that had grown accustomed to more humane standards. Yet, there are 
questions that remain unanswered (as to reactions to the current economic crisis, the 
potential concomitant response of states now aggressively employing the PLRA to 
seek relief from such oversight, and to potentially push the limits of the meaning of 
"constitutional minimums," the response of couns that may feel that economic 
conditions inhibit their willingness to enter expansive relief orders, or, perhaps 
seemingly paradoxically, whether states will take a proactive stance and work to 
responsibly reduce prison populations through legislative, sentencing reform, 
enlightened parole and probation practices, and serious effons at diversion and 
reentry, panicularly for persons with mental disabilities). The answers to these 
questions will be critical in determining the path of litigation in this area. 
The CRPD, although signed by President Obama, has not yet been ratified by the 
United States Senate. Nonetheless, its principles should serve as a model of "best 
practice," in the same way that the Convention on the Rights of the Child served as 
such a model in the Massachusetts case discussed earlier, 
140 
for all future inquiries 
into the rights of prisoners to adequate mental health care and treatment. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that it provides a potential blueprint for litigators looking for 
fresh approaches to the seemingly intractable constellation of legal and behavioral 
issues faced by prisoners with mental disabilities. 
138 See supra text accompanying notes 78-82. 
139 See Nathan, supra note 73. 
140 Adoption of Peggy, 767 NE 2d 29, 38 (Mass 2002). See supra note 113. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court-albeit by the most slender of majorities-has made it 
clear in a series of criminal law and procedure cases that international human rights 
law is a legitimate source of rights in any determination of appropriate domestic 
constitutional standards. 141 Although lower courts have, in the past, incorporated 
UN Standards, Covenants and Conventions in decisions dealing with prisoners 
rights' issues, the Supreme Court has never, to this date, had the occasion to 
construe this body of law in a correctional conditions case. 
The CRPD is a beacon to those who advocate for persons with disabilities. 142 In 
his definitive encyclopedia about Bob Dylan's music, Oliver Trager characterizes 
Shelter From the Storm (from which the beginning of the title of this article comes) as 
concluding that "the possibility of redemption still exists."143 We believe that 
lawyers representing plaintiffs in institutional condition cases should tum to the 
convention as a potential affirmative source of rights on behalf of their clients, and 
as a strategy for offering "redemption" to this population. In arguing in support of 
the U.S.'s ratification of the convention, Tara Melish recently wrote that 
"Ratification will allow us simultaneously to serve as a model for the rest of the 
world, projecting our commitment to the rights of persons with disabilities outward, 
while ensuring that we are in fact living up to that projection as a nation and social 
community of equals at home." 144 This is a development that lawyers representing 
prison inmates must follow if correctional law is to grow and expand . 
141 This is a matter of great contention in the Supreme Court. Contrast Justice Kennedy's embrace of 
international law in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (persons with mental retardation exempt from 
capital punishment under the cruel and unusual punishment clause) with Justice Scalia's total repudiation 
of it in Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) Guveniles exempt from capital 
punishment under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). For recent scholarly investigations, see 
e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use And Abuse Of Foreign Law In Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARv. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 653 (2009); Melissa A. Waters, Getting Beyond The Crossfire Phenomenon: A Militant 
Moderate's Take On The Role Of Foreign Authority In Constitutional Interpretation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
635 (2008). 
142 Compare Lisa Widawsky, In My Backyard: How Enabling Hazardous Waste Trade To Developing 
Nations Can Improve The Basel Convention's Ability To Achieve Environmental Justice, 38 ENVTI.. L. 577, 602 
(2008) (discussing how environmental convention is "a beacon of hope for achieving ... justice."). 
143 OUVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 554 (2004). 
144 Melish, supra note 128, at 47. 
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